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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD JOHNSON and ROBERT
JOHNSON, d/b/a JOHNSON
BROTHERS, GENERAL CONTRACTORS,
Case No. 870104
and
870108

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Argument Priority No. 14B
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY
COMPANY AND KIEWIT WESTERN
COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
L. P. BIORN, INC. OF WYOMING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GALLEGOS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY
COMPANY AND KIEWIT WESTERN
COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The District Judge in his ruling on February 2, 1987, found
and concluded that the defendant Gallegos Construction Company
was a materialman and not a sub-contractor of the contractor,
Kiewit Western Company.

The Court further found that materialmen

do not fall within the scope of the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 63-56-38 or Title 14, Chapter 1.

Finally the

Court concluded that as the plaintiffs, Johnson Brothers,
provided

equipment to a materialman, Gallegos Construction

Company, that they did not have a cause of action on the payment
1

bond provided for the protection of sub-contractors.

Plaintiffs

contend that the Court committed error in these conclusions and
therefore, respectfully raise the issues as follows:
Is Gallegos Construction Company a sub-contractor of Kiewit
Western Company fully protected by the payment bond furnished by
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company?
Is the bond, which was issued by Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company governed by Section 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated or
Section 63-56-38, Utah Code Annotated?
Does the bond issued by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
cover rental equipment?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State of Utah hired the defendant Kiewit as the general
contractor of the 2100 South Highway Project (R. 171) for a total
contract price of $11,491,141.40.
payment bond on the project.

Defendant Aetna supplied a

The bond states on its face:

...this bond is executed pursuant to the provisions of
Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, and all liabilities on this bond to all such
claimants shall be determined in accordance with said
provisions to the same extent as if it were copied at
length herein. (See Addendum "A")
During the course of the construction project, Kiewit hired
Gallegos to supply gravel to the project (R. 216).

Gallegos1

contract with Kiewit required Gallegos to manufacture and deliver
approximately 690,000 cubic yards of borrow, 260,000 tons of
granular borrow, and 128,000 tons of base course with a contract
value of about $2.5 million.

Gallegos used a commercial gravel

pit, which was used primarily for this project (R. 192), to
2

manufacture the gravel to Utah Department of Transportation
specifications.
In the course of manufacturing gravel from the pit and
delivering it to the job site, Gallegos rented certain equipment
from the plaintiff Johnson Brothers (R. 169-170) for which
plaintiffs have not been paid in the amount of $16,848.90 plus
interest (R. 179).
Prior to filing this action, plaintiffs telephoned a
representative of Aetna regarding the procedure for obtaining
payment under the bond (R. 182). The telephone conversation took
place within the 90 day period required for filing a claim on the
contractor's bond as required in Sections 14-1-14 and 63-56-38 of
the Utah Code Annotated

(R. 183, 193, 195).

During

this

telephone conversation, plaintiffs were directed by Aetna's
representative to send a written notice of the plaintiff's claim
as required under Section 14-1-14 of the Utah Code Annotated to
Kiewit and that the claim would thereby be processed (R. 183).
Within the 90 day period required under the Sections listed
above, plaintiffs sent Kiewit a written notice as required under
Section 14-1-14 of the Utah Code Annotated and as indicated on
the payment bond (R. 182).

Kiewit and Aetna refused and failed

to pay the amount due plaintiffs from defendant Gallegos,
plaintiffs therefore filed this Complaint (R. 5-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Gallegos Construction Company entered into a contract with
the sub-contractor, Kiewit Western Company, to perform a
3

substantial portion of Kiewit Western's contract with the State
of Utah.

Gallegos Construction Company provided customized

material for the job site.

Thus, Gallegos Construction Company

more appropriately can be classified or identified as a subcontractor of the general contractor Kiewit Western Company
rather than as a materialman or supplier of Kiewit Western.
Plaintiffs, Johnson Brothers General Contractors, rented
equipment to Gallegos for use in preparing and
materials

to the

job site at the

instance

delivering
of Gallegos

Construction Company and therefore are protected by the bond
issues by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and are entitled to
have this Court reverse the decision of the District Court Judge
and enter judgment against Aetna Casualty and Surety Company for
all just amounts due to the plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
GALLEGOS IS A SUB-CONTRACTOR UNDER KIEWIT AND THEREFORE THE
PAYMENT BOND COVERS GALLEGOS1 INDEBTEDNESS TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
Under a recent decision by this Court, Gallegos should be
found to be a subcontractor rather than merely a materialman. In
Jacobson Construction Company v. Industrial Indemnity Company,
657 P.2d 1325, (Utah 1983), this Court indicated some of the
factors

which

determination.

should

be considered

in making

such a

In its opinion, this Court accepted and approved

the District Court's Jury Instruction No. 16, which reads:
A subcontractor means one who has contracted with the
original contractor for the performance of all or a
part of the work or services which such contractor has
himself contracted to perform.
4

In support of this decision, this Court cited with approval a
California Supreme Court decision, Theisen Free v, County of Los
Angeles, 54 Cal.2d 170, 5 Cal. Rptr. 161, 352 P.2d 529 (1960),
and in particular the following language:
[W]e conclude that one who agrees with the prime
contractor to perform a substantial, specified portion
of the work of construction, which is the subject of
the general contract, in accord with the plans and
specifications by which the prime contractor is
bound...is a sub-contractor although he does not
undertake on himself to incorporate such portion
of the projected structure into the building. Id.
at 1328, citing 5 Cal. Rptr. at 161, 352 P.2d at 537.
In the present action, Gallegos was required to manufacture
borrow from its own pit according to the Utah Department of
Transportation specifications.

In a case strikingly similar to

the present case, McElhose v. Universal Surety Company, 182 Neb
847, 158 N.W.2d 228 (1968), the middleman, a gravel company, had
contracted with the general contractor, a highway construction
company, to furnish and deliver gravel to the general contractor
in a large quantity and on a daily basis.

The middleman rented

two tractors from the plaintiff for use at its gravel pits which
were located 13, 16, and 28 miles from the project site.

During

the project period, the middleman continued to sell gravel to
other customers.

The Court concluded that the middleman was a

subcontractor and thus covered by the payment bond.

The court

noted that:
the written contract between [the general contractor]
and [the middleman] for furnishing gravel according to
specifications and for delivering it to the project
site in the quantity required points toward [the
middleman] as a subcontractor and not a supplier. Id.
at 233.
5

The Court further stated:
We point out that [the middleman] had a written
contract with [the general contractor] to deliver about
33,424 cubic yards of gravel at the site of the project
for the sum of $97,709.50. We thing this contract for
the delivery of gravel in such a quantity and for such
a price for material so essential to the construction
of a highway makes [the middleman] a subcontractor.
Id. at 234-235.
In the present action, Gallegos rented equipment from
Johnson Brothers in order to fulfill its contractual obligation
to Kiewit of providing 690,000 cubic yards of borrow, 260,000
tons of granular borrow, and 128,000 tons of base course (R. 169170).

The value of this contract was nearly $2,500,000.00.

The

overall project was awarded to Kiewit for $11,500,000.00.
Gallegosf contract with Kiewit represented 21.74% of the overall
price.

As these

figures

suggest, Gallegos

performed

a

substantial and specified portion of the construction project
without which the project would not have proceeded.

Gallegos1

contractual obligation satisfies the test enunciated by this
Court in Jacobsen that the subcontractor be a party who performs
"all or a part of the work or services which [the general
contractor] has himself contracted to perform."
1328.

Jacobsen, at

Gallegos' contractual obligation also satisfies the test

announced in Theisen that the subcontractor be a party "who in
the course of the performance of he prime contract constructs a
definite, substantial part of the work."

Theisen, at 537.

The facts in the present case are also very similar to those
in Basich Brothers Construction Company v. United States, 159
F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1946), in which the prime contractor, Basich

6

Brothers
labor,

entered a contract

with Duque and F r a z z i n i

s u p p l i e s and equipment r e q u i r e d

provisions
States.

of

the

Basich

Brothers

to _furnish

t o comply w i t h

contract

with

certain

the

United

Duque and F r a z z i n i were t o produce g r a v e l , rock and sand

and d e l i v e r

i t t o Basich B r o t h e r s who in t u r n t r u c k e d i t to the

project.

The

Court

found

that

Duque

and

Frazzini

were

s u b c o n t r a c t o r s w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e M i l l e r Act, basing

its

d e c i s i o n on the f o l l o w i n g language from MacEvoy v. United S t a t e s :
The s u b - c o n t r a c t o r i s one who performs f o r and t a k e s
from the prime c o n t r a c t o r a s p e c i f i c p a r t of t h e labor
or m a t e r i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t a c t , . . .
I d . a t 183.
The Court concluded as f o l l o w s :
Duque and F r a z z i n i , having performed for and taken from
B a s i c h B r o t h e r s a s p e c i f i c p a r t of t h e l a b o r and
m a t e r i a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of [ s p e c i f i c i t e m s of t h e ]
o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t , f u l l y meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h a t
t e s t and a r e , t h e r e f o r e , s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s w i t h i n t h e
meaning and scope of the " M i l l e r Act." Ld. a t 183.
The

Bas i c h

case

was

cited

with

approval

in

Tiffany

C o n s t r u c t i o n v. Hancock and Kelly C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, 24 A r i z .
App. 504, 539 P.2d 978 (1975), as support for t h a t

Court's

view

t h a t one f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r in d e t e r m i n i n g whether a s u p p l i e r was
in f a c t

a sub-contractor

for

t h e purposes of a bonding

statute

was whether t h e items t h e s u p p l i e r provided was " c u s t o m i z e d . "
Gallegos
granular

agreed

borrow

Transportation
manufacturing
Therefore,

to

with

Kiewit

conform

with

specifications.

process

before

to

manufacture
the

The

Utah

c o n t r a r y t o the f i n d i n g

7

of

the

and

Department

material

being d e l i v e r e d

borrow

required

t o t h e job

District

Court,

of
a

site.
the

material

supplied

"customized."
supplier

by

Gallegos

Therefore,

this

should
Court

be c h a r a c t e r i z e d

should

hold

that,

as

as a

of "customized" m a t e r i a l , Gallegos was a s u b - c o n t r a c t o r

r a t h e r than a m a t e r i a l m a n .
POINT I I
THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 14-1-14
GOVERN THE BOND ISSUED IN THIS CASE.
On January 7, 1985, Aetna furnished a bond at the instance
of Kiewit pursuant to the requirements of the statutes of the
State of Utah (See Addendum "A").

The bond, according to its own

terms was issued under the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1 of
the Utah Code Annotated.

At the top of the document and just

under the title of the bond is set forth the title and chapter of
the Utah Code Annotated under which this bond was issued.
center

At the

of the printed matter of the bond is the following

language:
Provided, however, that this bond is executed pursuant
to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and all liabilities on
this bond to all such claimants shall be determined in
accordance with said provisions, to the same extent as
if it were copied at length herein.
Section 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated titled "Actions on
Payment Bond" provides for the following notice requirements:
(2) Any person having a contract with a sub-contractor
of the contractor, but no express or implied contract
with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, shall
have a right of action upon the payment bond upon
giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days
from the date on which the last of the labor was
performed or material was supplied...
The District Court held that rental equipment falls within
8

the scope of Section 63-56-38 of the Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, effective April 29, 1985 as well as Section 14-1-1
plaintiff's remedy under the bond.

The primary difference

between the two sections is that Section 63-56-38, as amended in
1985, requires that the claimant on the bond to provide "written
notice to the contractor and surety company within 90 days from
the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material
was supplied..." (Emphasis added.)

Section 14-1-14 as quoted

above does not require the written notice to be delivered to the
surety company.
Although

Section 63-56-38 applies to State projects

generally, the contractors' payment bond

indicates that

obligations under the bond arise "pursuant to the provisions of
Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended."
Therefore, the District Court properly held that the notice
provisions of that section should control rather than the notice
provisions as required in Section 63-56-38.
Even if the District Court had held that the notice
provisions contained in Section 63-56-38 applied to the instant
case, the defendants should be estopped from claiming lack of
notice because Aetna received actual notice of the claim.

This

argument is illustrated by a decision by this Court which applied
the notice requirement contained in the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A.
Section 270B, which has language similar to that in Section 14-114.
*n

Whiting Brothers Construction
9

Company v. M. & S.

Construction & Engineering Company, 18 Utah 2d 43, 414 P.2d 961,
(1966), the prime contractor Whiting Brothers, had been engaged
to do construction work at the Cedar City, Utah Airport.

It had

sub-contracted a portion of this project to M. & S. Construction,
which in turn had contracted with Hoyt & Smith for certain
services and materials.

When M. & S. Construction went out of

business, they failed to pay their obligations to Hoyt & Smith.
In an action against Whiting Brothers and the surety, the
question before the Court was "whether Hoyt & Smith could recover
from Whiting Brothers and their surety when they failed to
strictly comply with the notice provisions of the Miller Act."
Id. at 962. After the default of M. & S., Hoyt & Smith discussed
their claims with responsible agents of Whiting Brothers and were
assured something would be done to take care of them.

In

addition, WhitingTs attorney wrote Hoyt & Smith acknowledging the
default of M. & S. and advised that such steps were being taken
to rectify the situation if possible.
This Court indicated:
The Miller Act's dominate purpose is to protect
laborers and materialmen of sub-contractors and it
should be liberally construed to effectuate this
purpose. The purpose of the 90 day notice was to
enable the prime contractor to protect himself and his
surety against a delinquent or defaulting subcontractor. 1(3. at 962.
This Court held that even though written notice was not
given, Whiting Brothers were fully aware of the claim and would
not have benefited by receipt of the notice.

Therefore, the

Court held that Whiting Brothers could not assert the defense of
10

f a i l u r e by Hoyt and Smith t o give t h e 90 day w r i t t e n n o t i c e .
In

the

instant

plaintiffs

called

case,

the

Aetna's

District

Court

representative

found

and

were

that
given

i n s t r u c t i o n s on the procedure for e s t a b l i s h i n g a claim on the
contractor's

bond (R. 183, 193, 195).

Plaintiffs

send w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o the prime c o n t r a c t o r ,
the

claim

Plaintiffs
written

procedure

and

that

their

were t o l d

Kiewit,

remedy

to

to commence

would

follow.

did so w i t h i n the 90 day p e r i o d and complied with the
notice

requirement

entirely

w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o Aetna (R. 1 8 2 ) .

except

for

sending

the

Because Aetna was aware of t h e

claim and had given s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n on the method t o proceed
on the c l a i m , sending an a d d i t i o n a l w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o Aetna would
have accomplished n o t h i n g .
from c l a i m i n g t h a t
Utah

strengthened
against

Aetna should be estopped

proper n o t i c e was not g i v e n

Code A n n o t a t e d ,

Annotated,

Therefore,

Section
by t h e

Section

14-1-14

63-56-38
fact

that

Kiewit and Aetna p r i o r

(1983),

as r e q u i r e d
and

(1985).

This

plaintiffs

initiated

to the expiration

Utah

argument
their

by

Code
is
suit

of the 90 day

p e r i o d in which n o t i c e must be g i v e n .
POINT I I I
THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR EQUIPMENT RENTED IS A VALID OBLIGATION
UNDER THE APPLICABLE PAYMENT BOND STATUTE.
Kiewit was required under either Section 14-1-13 or Section
63-56-38(1)(b) to obtain a payment bond "in an amount equal to
100$ of the price specified in the contract...for the protection
of all persons supplying labor and material to the contractor or
its sub-contractors for the performance of work provided for in
11

the contract."

Section 63-56-38(1 )(b) , Utah Code Annotated.

Kiewit obtained the requisite bond from Aetna.
As a general rule, a statutory bond of the type involved in
this action is remedial in nature and is entitled to a liberal
construction.

The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting

the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. Section 270A et seq., language of
which is similar to the Utah counterpart said that:
The Miller Act, like the Heard Act, is highly remedial
in nature. It is entitled to a liberal construction
and application to effectuate a congressional intent to
protect those whose labor and materials go into public
projects.
Clifford F. MacEvoy Company v. United
States, 322 U.S. 102, 88 L. Ed. 1163 (1943).
Although some jurisdictions have held otherwise, Judge
Griffin Bell, then with the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, noted that the Miller Act and its predecessor statute
have been "uniformly construed to include equipment rentals." J.
W. Carruth v. Standard Accident Insurance, 329 F.2d 690, 693 (5th
Cir. 1964).
The Utah counterpart to the Miller Act construed in the same
liberal fashion would result in the same conclusion.

J. F.

Tolton Investment Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 293 P.
611 (Utah 1930) was a case where a sub-contractor defaulted in
payment to plaintiffs for materials and labor.

Plaintiffs

brought suit on the payment bond for various items including a
claim for an amount due for rental of an engine used on the job.
In that case, four of the five Justices held with regard to the
claim

for

the

rental

that

"under

the liberal

rule of

interpretation to which we are committed, we conclude that the
12

charge in question is within the obligation of the bond, and the
surety was properly held liable therefore."

Ici. at 615.

Even if the Court did not liberally construe the Utah
statutes, a basic rule of statutory construction should lead this
Court to the conclusion that "labor and material" includes rental
equipment.

As stated in a recent decision by this Court:

In construing legislative enactments or municipal
ordinances, the primary responsibility of this Court is
to give effect to the legislature's underlying intent.
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983).
See also Arizona Denite Builders, Inc. v. Continental,
105 Ariz. 99, 459 P.2d 724 (1969).
In attempting to determine the legislature's intent, the
Court should look to other statutes which deal with the same
subject matter.

This Court in Murray City cited Sutherland

Statutory Construction to this effect:
In the terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that
whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind previous statutes relating to the same subject
matter, wherefore it is held that in the absence of any
express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision
was enacted in accord with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes, and they should all
be construed together.
Provisions in the act which are omitted in another
act relating to the same subject matter will be applied
in a proceeding under the other act, when not
inconsistent with its purposes.
Prior statutes
relating to the same subject matter are to be compared
with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable
construction, both are to be so construed that effect
is given to every provision in all of them.
Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent
conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed
to be in harmony with each other. But if there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the new provisions and
the prior statutes relating to the same subject matter,
the new provision will control as it is the later
expression of the legislature. Ld. at 1318.
In addition to the subject matter, the doctrine of in pari
13

materia applies to "statutes which relate to the same person or
thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or which have a
common purpose..." 82 CJS Statutes, Section 366, pp. 801-802. In
applying this doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court has noted the
similarity of the lien and bond statutes:
Because of the common purpose of these lien and
contractor's bond statutes [referring to Sections 14-22 and 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953)], and their
practically identical language, adjudications as to
what is lienable under the former are helpful in
determining the proper application of the latter. 13
Utah 2d 339, 341; 374 P.2d 254 (1962).
The Utah Mechanic's Lien law was amended in 1981 to include
language specifically referring to rental materials or equipment
used in construction or improvements.

See Section 38-1-3.

The

legislature amended the provisions relating to private contracts
in 1985 to include similar language about rental equipment.
Section 14-2-1.

See

The public contracts and procurement code

bonding sections (See Sections 14-1-13 and 63-56-38) have not
been amended to include rental language but it is clear that all
of the statutes referred to deal with the same class of persons,
namely those who have furnished labor, materials and equipment on
construction projects.

The Court should construe the statutes

effecting this class of claims in a rational manner consistent
with the legislature's intent.

Its intent with regard to

inclusion of those renting equipment is clear from the language
of the mechanic's lien and private bonding statutes.

The

legislature intended to proved broad coverage and this intent
should be applied by the court in interpreting the Utah public
14

contracts bonding statutes.
In R. C. Stanhope v. Roanoke Construction Company, 539 F.2d
992 (4th Cir. 1976), Roanoke was the prime contractor and subcontracted to Lockwood.

Lockwood rented certain equipment from

Stanhope and then defaulted on the rental payments and also
failed to return some of the equipment rented.

The only issue on

appeal was whether Stanhope's rental charges and the value of
missing rental equipment constituted materials furnished within
the meaning of the Virginia payment bond statute.

The Court held

that both the rental charges and missing rental equipment
constituted "materials furnished" under the Code.

Chief Judge

Haynsworth concurred in part and dissented in part.

He dissented

with regard to the missing rental equipment and felt that those
items were not covered by the term "materials furnished."
However, he cited a recent amendment to the Virginia Mechanic's
Lien Statute to include the reasonable rental or use value of
equipment.

He said:

There is nothing to indicate that the general assembly
ever intended to provide greater protection for
materialmen and sub-contractors on private construction
projects than that furnished to such suppliers on
public projects. He indicates that the Court's
logic "strongly suggests the legislative intention
to equate materialmen and sub-contractors on public
projects with the statutory protections afforded
such supplies on private projects. The statement
by the Supreme Court of Virginia that [its law] is
remedial and must be given a liberal construction
convinces me that whatever doubts might arise from
the adoption in 1968 of the amendment to [mechanic's
lien laws] should be resolved in favor of a
construction of the [payment bond statute] so as to
include the rental value of rental equipment furnished
within the meaning of "materials."
15

Furthermore,

this

also

logically

follows from

the

requirement in the Public Bonding Statutes that the payment bond
cover "100% of the price specified in the contract."

On any

large public construction project, it is very likely that some
the costs will include costs of rental equipment.

If rental

equipment is not included in the bond, then the Utah statutes
require an excess of bonding coverage beyond that necessary to
protect the sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers.
Because the payment bond statutes are remedial in nature,
their provisions should be construed liberally to include rental
equipment within the definition of "materials" furnished on the
project.
CONCLUSION
The State of Utah hired the defendant Kiewit Western Company
as general contractor

of the 2100 South Highway Project for a

total contract price of $11,491,141.40.

Within the course of the

construction project, Kiewit Western Company hired Gallegos
Construction Company as a sub-contractor to manufacture and
deliver approximately 690,000 cubic yards of borrow, 260 tons of
granular borrow and 128 tons of base course pursuant to a
contract with a value of about $2.5 million dollars.
Construction

Company entered

Gallegos

into an agreement with the

Plaintiffs, Johnson Brothers General Contractors, to lease
equipment from plaintiffs for the preparation and delivery of the
borrow and base course materials to the project job site.

Aetna

Casualty and Surety Company provided a 100% performance and
16

payment bond for the project pursuant to the requirements of
Section 14-1-14, Utah Code Annotated.

Plaintiffs were not paid

sums which they had earned pursuant to their agreement with
Gallegos Construction Company.

The sum due the plaintiffs is

$16,848.90 together with interest, attorney's fees and costs.
Plaintiffs gave proper notice of their claim to the general
contractor, Kiewit Western Company and the surety, Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company.

Thus, plaintiffs contend that they are

entitled to have judgment entered in their favor against Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company in an amount as proven at the time of
trial.
Respectfully submitted this

/7;^2~day of July, 1987.

Attorney / o r

Plaintiffs-Appellants

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered the four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Defendants1
attorney, Mr. Robert F. Babcock of Walstad & Babcock at 185 South
State Street, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this
/7&day of July, 1987.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD JOHNSON and ROBERT JOHNSON,
dba JOHNSON BROTHERS, GENERAL
CONTRACTORS,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND JUDGEMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GALLEGC3 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY
AND KIEWIT WESTERN COMPANY,

Civil No. C85-7945
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.
This case came on for non-jury trial on November 19, 1986 before the Court.
Richard and Robert Johnson ("Plaintiffs") were present and represented by their attorney,
Gary II. Weight.
Casualty

Defendant Kiewit Western Company was present and both Aetnu

& Surety

Company

and

Kiewit

Western

Company

("Defendants")

were

represented by their attorneys, Robert F. Babcock and Mary Louise LeCheminant.
FINDFNGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of the evidence and the arguments of counsel the Court
enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
A.

Findings of Fact
1.

The

State of Utah hired Kiewit Western Company ("Kiewit") as

the general contractor for the 2100 South Highway Project.
2.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Company ("Aetna") supplied a bond on

the project issued pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Title 14, Chapter 1 (1953, as

amended) according to the language found at the top of the bond and within the body
of the bond,
3.

Kiewit hired Gallegos Construction Company ("Gallegos") to supply

gravel which (a) was readily available in the market as a stock in trade item and (b)
could be sold to others in the ordinary course of business without material sacrifice if
it were not used on the 2100 South Highway Project,
4.

Plaintiffs entered into a lease agreement with Gallegos for the

lease of certain equipment and all equipment from the Plaintiffs used by Gallegos at
the commercial gravel pit was either rented or leased.
5.

The Plaintiffs called Aetna within ninety days from the last day

Plaintiffs provided labor or materials to Gallegos to obtain payment under the bond
and were told to send written notice of their claim to Kiewit.
6. The Plaintiffs sent Kiewit written notice and filed this action within
ninety days from the last day Plaintiffs provided labor or materials to Gallegos.
B.

Conclusions of Law
1. Defendants are estopped from claiming (a) proper notice was not

given as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985) and (b) Utah Code
Annotated, Section 14-1-14 (1983) is not the applicable statute in this matter.
2. Leased and rental equipment fall writhin the scope of the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985) and Title 14, Chapter 1 (1953, as
amended).
3.

Gallegos was a materialman and not a subcontractor of Kiewit.

4. Materialmen do not fall within the scope of the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985) or Title 14, Chapter 1 (1953, as amended).
5. As Plaintiffs provided equipment to Gallegos, a materialman, they
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subcontractors,
JUDGEMENT
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees basec upon
the foregoing findings and conclusions, that the Plaintiffs have no cause of action on
the payment bond and thus the Court finds in favor of the Defendants, with costs to
the Defendants,
DATED this

J-

rtmr
nf
day of

T^/s^

198"

BY THE COURT:
c; \

Homer F. Wilkinson
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, on this ^Q'^^^'ay
, 1987 to:
Gary H. Weight
Attorney for Plaintiffs
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603

of

LEASE

AGREEMENT

,

AGREEMENT of lease made and entered into this.

by and between . . . ^ / M ^ ^ . ^ ^ f ^ S .
hereinafter called LESSOR and ..l£.A//££.CS.

LQ&.£3&J&£$^O...L.Q...

hereinafter called LESSEE.
Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, LESSOR does hereby lease to
LESSEE the following described vehicle:
1. DESCRIPTION OF VEHICLE:
M a k e . £ # Z l . Year.

Model. ML

Serial No.~

Motor No

2. TERMS OF LEASE:

Special Equipment

| A

The commencement date of this Lease shall be as indicated a|gve and this Lease shall expire
on the . . . . . / ^ T .
day of....:v/^3£
notice by LESSOR of default and expiration.

, 19..c£~L, or fifteen days after written

3. LEASE PAYMENTS:
In consideration of the lease of said vehicle, LESSEE shall pay to LESSOR the total sum
of $ . / < £ ^
pa^bk4ft-ad«mee a*-the-*ate of $
^&T..
per 4&@£
ytes^mh=State oalec taxi The first such monthly payment shall be due and owing on the 1st
day of the calendar month following the date of execution of this Agreement and the remainder of
such payments shall be due and owing on the 1st day of each month thereafter during the term
of this Agreement. LESSEE deposits with LESSOR on execution of this Agreement the sum of
$....^4?^.tT
, to be held in escrow to guarantee completion of lease. In the
event such monthly payments are fifteen days past due, the LESSOR shall have the right to charge
LESSEE a penalty fee equal to five (5%) per cent of such past due payment.
4. ADDITIONAL RENT:
In the event that such vehicle shall be operated in excess

.

/
..miles in

any year of this Lease, then LESSEE agrees to pay to LESSOR an amount equal to „.jfLl.ct:cents per mile for each mile such vehicle is driven in excess of said aforementioned mileage figure
during any such year of this Lease. LESSEE further agrees to provide LESSOR with a report
each month at the time monthly payments are made of the mileage driven during the month preceding such payment.

5. INSURANCE
LESSEE agrees it shall, at its sole cost and expense, maintain in full force on such vehicle during the term of this Agreement automobile bodily injury liability insurance coverage with minimum
limits of $100,000—$300,000 dollars and automobile property damage liability insurance of a
minimum amount of $25,000 for each such vehicle, together with actual cash value comprehensive
insurance and collision insurance subject to $100 deductible on each such vehicle in an insurance
company acceptable to LESSOR. LESSEE shall furnish to LESSOR a copy of such insurance policies prior to taking delivery of such vehicle, and LESSEE shall cause LESSOR to he named as an
additional insured in such policies of insurance and name \J&/fofrC}/!s ^ ^ v ^
as Loss Payee; and, further, LESSEE agrees to indemnify and to save LESSOR harmless from and
against any and all loss, damages, claims, liabilities and expense in any manner arising out of the
claims, injury or damage to persons or property as a result of LESSEE'S operation of such vehicle.
6. RETURN OF VEHICLE

y/?

LESSEE agrees that upon expiration of the period for which such vehicle has been leased or
upon expiration of the rights of LESSEE under the terms and conditions of this Agreement, such
vehicle shall be returned to the LESSOR in as good condition as such vehicle was when received
by LESSEE, reasonable wear and tear excepted; and, further, delivery and return of such vehicle
shall be made at the office of the LESSOR at Salt Lake City, Utah.
7. OPERATION OF VEHICLE:
^ a . LESSEE agrees that such vehicle will be operated in a careful manner by licensed drivers,
and that each such driver shall be selected, employed and controlled by the LESSEE solely, and
such driver shall be presumed conclusively to be the agent and/or employee of the LESSEE.
b. LESSEE agrees that such vehicle shall not be operated or used in violation of any federal,
state or municipal law or regulation.
LESSEE may at his sole cost and expense paint or affix to said vehicle any appropriate
advertisement; provided, however, that LESSEE shall on the termination of this Agreement pay to
LESSOR an amount equal1 to the cost and expense of removal of such advertisement and restore
the finish of such vehicle to its original condition.

fJA

LESSEE agrees to maintain and pay all repairs made on said automobile not covered by
factory warranty.

M-

e. All repairs for physical damage to such vehicle whenever possible shall be made at LESSOR'S place of business, or the permission of LESSOR shall be first had and obtained to make
such repairs elsewhere.
Mi

Such vehicle shall be used only within the boundaries of the continental United States.

A>ng. LESSEE agrees that he shall not overload such vehicle beyond its rated capacity, and in
the event of overloading, LESSEE agrees to pay all damages to such vehicle and tires resulting from
overloading.
LESSEE assumes and agrees to pay all towing charges and any other cost and expense relating to operation of such vehicle unless, such costs and expenses are incurred with the LESSOR'S
written consent,
8. OWNERSHIP OF VEHICLE:
At all times during the term of this Lease such vehicle shall be the property of LESSOR, and
the LESSEE shall have the sole right to use the same, subject to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement; and LESSEE shall have no property interest in and to such vehicle.

9. DEFAULT BY LESSEE:
In the event LESSEE files or there is caused to be filed a petition in bankruptcy or shall make
or have made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if a receiver shall be appointed for
LESSEE, or if LESSEE shall have permitted or suffered any attachment, levy, execution to be
made, levied or entered against or in any respect of any or all of LESSEE'S property, then upon
giving five days written notice to LESSEE, the rights of LESSEE under this Agreement shall expire.
In the event that LESSEE fails to make any payment due and owing hereunder for a period
of fifteen days after such payment is due, then the rights of LESSEE under this Agreement shall
expire.
In the event that LESSEE shall fail to perform any of the terms and conditions required of
LESSEE to perform under this Agreement, and upon fifteen days written notice of such failure to
perform, then the rights of LESSEE under this Agreement shall expire.
10. DAMAGES:
In the event that LESSEE fails to perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement and the rights of LESSEE hereunder expire then LESSEE agrees to pay to LESSOR
any and all amounts of unpaid monthly payments computed to the date of return of such vehicle together with any loss or damage which LESSOR may suffer as a result of the breach of this Agreement
by LESSEE, it being mutually agreed between the LESSOR and the LESSEE that the minimum
amount of such loss as a result of any such breach as liquidated damages due and payable on the
date of expiration of this Lease shall be a sum equal to one-third of the monthly payments that
would have been paid if the Lease had continued in full force and effect for the period set forth in
paragraph two above without consideration of the shortening of the term by reason of default.
11. ATTORNEY'S FEE:
LESSEE agrees to pay LESSOR a reasonable attorney's fee in the event that an attorney is
employed to enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement by LESSOR.
12. NOTICES:
Any notice required to be given hereunder shall be deemed completed two days after posting
with postage prepaid in regular U. S. mail to each of the parties at the respective addresses indicated in the initial paragraph of this lease Agreement.
13. AMENDMENTS:
Any amendment in this Agreement must be made in writing and attached to this Agreement.
This Agreement contains all of the agreements between the parties hereto and no representations
either oral ,or written made before this Agreement shall be considered a part of this Agreement unless included herein.
14. BENEFIT:
This Agreement shall be binding upon and enure to the benefit of the legal representatives, heirs,
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto; provided, however, that LESSEE shall not have the
right to assign or sublet the vehicle leased hereunder. Whenever herein the singular number is used,
the same shall include the plural and the masculine gender shall include the neuter.
15. ELECTION OF REMEDIES:
The LESSOR shall have the sole right of enforcement of the terms and conditions of this Agreement at its sole discretion and the failure to exercise any rights of the LESSOR hereunder shall not
constitute a waiver of such rights, it being mutually agreed between the parties that the remedies
of the LESSOR hereunder are cumulative.

16. Customer agrees to purchase and pay property taxes and license fees for all years pertaining to
this lease except the originating license fees.
17. This lease and any cars leased thereunder will be subject to any rights and interest in and to
said cars under any respective contract of/or contracts that any lending institution may hold on the
same.
The undersigned hereby assigns toall rentals and funds due and to become due the undersigned assignment is made and given as
security for any and all obligations due or to become due from the undersigned to said bank.

By

J//f«t /~
tfS~
y

Date; ****** T
18.

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS:

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this instrument, in triplicate, this
day and year first above written.
LESSEE

LESSOR

V.SST... 87-0335018

MATERIAL CONTRACT

THIS AGREEMENT. mad« this

27th.

day of

Job Hand** _ * 0 8 0 _ £ ^ .

2*£.™

Gallegoa Construction Co.,Jfac^;^566 West

H1

19_:L~. by and between

g Q W O o d **•» Kaarna, UT 84118

(Seller** Name, AddraM and Phone No.)

J01 = 966 = 8893

hereinifter

^

the ^

and

_Me^Jt„ W e ^ e r n . _ ^

, .

(Contractor Nana, Addr— and Phoae No.)

Murray, Utah

84107^0780

801-266-8879

§ h e r e i n a f t e r ^ theCoiltIBetorp WITNESSETH:

Route 201, 2100 South Freeway, 3850 to
^!^^^^%j».J^^!^^lz!^Q^LL
lor

^^.^.^^^^^.J^^^l^^^.

(Name of Project)

r._.E.~~~T

/>
'J

State

Section 1. The Seller agrees to furnish all material set forth in "Section 2" hereof necessary in the construction of

hereinafter Called the Owner, at

Y/f

(Owner)

... V_..Z. > ...^Z.^.?^T

, in accordance with the terms and

(Location of Project)

provisions of t h e Contract between the Owner and the Contractor, dated

*~~~?.

, 19

» and the General

and Special Conditions. Drawings and Specifications prepared by J ^ ^ . M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ % ^ L ^ . ^ ^ . 9 ^ ^ % 9 ^ . .
.(Architect or Engineer)

hereinafter called the Architect or Engineer, forming a part of the Contract between the Contractor and the Owner, all of which shall be
considered part of this Agreement by reference thereto, and the Seller agrees to be bound to the Contractor by the tsnns.&nd wgvisions thereof.
ROUTE
ALL PA YMENlTR
"3
*

Section 2. It is agreed that the materials to be furnished by the Seller are as follower-) £ ^ £ £ 5

Quantity

*

W30.000 CY

Matarial

BEFORE

AND

FILING.

USE

TAK^BV*&&
"'

Borrow

BOND APPROVED
DATE

,
•* 'M *> v**.

i+-.4\-*

BY

Ml material furnished under this Agreement is to be delivered F.O.B
. with freight allowed to

.„.?

^M^Mijl^Uh-

S e c t i o n 3. The Contractor agrees tojpav the Seller for the materials to be furnished, as aforesaid, the sum of ..f*~*®•

SJj;ty..mQUsand...and_..no/10p_

__

**?~.™£?.^

DoUars (*?60,00.0..0^

subject

3 additions and deductions for changes as may result from operation of Contractor's contract with Owner, as follows:

90
Partial p a y m e n t s will be made to the Seller each month in an amount equal to
Z~f.
% of the value of materials delivered
> t h e site, computed on the basis of the prices set forth above, of the quantity as estimated by the Architect or Engineer, less t h e
ggregate of previous payments made hereunder, but such partial payments shall not become due to Seller until 10 days after the Conactor receives p a y m e n t for such materials from the Owner. If the Contractor receives payment from the Owner for less than the full
alue of materials delivered to the site but not y e t incorporated into the work, the amount due to the Seller on account of such materials
slivered to the site shall be proportionately reduced. N o partial payment to t}ie Sellers hall operate as approval or acceptance of t h e
:aterials furnished hereunder. Upon complete performance of this Material Contract by the Seller and final approval and acceptance
the materials by the Owner, the Contractor will make final payment to the Seller of the balance due him under this Material Contract
ithin .......ASf.
days after full payment for such materials has been received by the Contractor from the Owner. If at any time
ior t o final p a y m e n t hereunder, the Owner reduces the amount of retainage withheld from the Contractor, the Contractor may, at i t s
le discretion, reduce accordingly the retained percentage withheld from the Seller.
The Contractor m a y deduct from any amounts due or to become due to the Seller, any sum or sums owing by the Seller to t h e
mtractor; and in the event of any breach by the Seller of any part of this Agreement, or in the event of any lien, claim or other liality asserted against the Contractor, arising out of the Seller's performance hereunder * K ; A # U - C-TI~ ».—i
>
*--•—

KNOW ALL MIN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Th*t. . . . H ? J f i L H f . f . L 5 ^ ? . . . ? S - .

bereieificr referred to a* the

••PrtmclpA}." mad ._.£&?..£.?.^£..£*£H?.Lj&^

~

-
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beraiaafUr referred to as the •'Ohiigwe." U tbe amount of . E i ^ . i l l ^ f . l L * £ ! L J [ 2 H
j m e T h o u s a n d One H u n d r e d F o r t £ - o n e • n d ^ A 0 / 1 0 0 ^ - - - - - - - - ^ - | > o l j t T i ^ U f 6 9 1 , 1 4 1 . 4 0
Ibr tbe payment whereof. Ibe aaid Principal and Surety biod theaeel*ea. tbair heirs, adfointetreior*. «jLecutor*.
•uccetftort and a e s l p i s . fotatly and severally, firmly by these presents.
WHEREAS, tbe Principal baa aotered loto a certain written coot r act with tbe Obligee, daiad tbe
<.y of

_ . 1»

.... to construct . . < ? F . ? i f . ^

Signing

^

Io tbe County of . i l * ? £ . £ 5 h S
lor tbe approximate mm of

E

^

_
M

cvcn

^
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_

. . . , | u u of Utah, Project Ko. .^.L"ftl?.t?.5i

l

L . ? . " . J j D V 5 Hundred^N ine 5X7J?. I 2J?..J!!5?" s .^Il d 9P*

Hun<Jred
#

J.SF.tt:.^^
( s J i i . * ? l u A * A . - . f . 2 . . . . K -bleb contract la bereby referred
to and made a part hereof aa fully and to tbe I U D C extent as if copied at lecg*.h herein.
NOW. THERE FOR£. tbe ooodtUoo of tbla ©ciJptioo It ouch, tbat If tbe said Principal ahal! pay all claimants
supplying labor o r enate rials to bits or bit subcootractors io tbe prosecution of tbe wort provided for In aaid
cootrart. then. Ibis obligation shall be void, otherwise to remaio lo full force aod effect.
PROVIDED. HO^TVER. that this bood la executed pursuant to tbe prorlslooa of Title 24. Chapter 1. Utai
Code Annotated. 19S3, aa amended, aod all liabilities,on tbia bood to all such claimants aball be d « u m l t a i in
accordance with aaid prorlsiocs. to tbe s u a e extent as If It were copied el lesgtb bereia.
IK WITNESS WHEREOF, tbe aaid Principal aod Surety have signed aod aeaJed this Instrument this
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Veronica Maldonado
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•
TATE OF JJX&S NEBRASKA
O W T Y O r f t y ^ * ^ S DOUGLAS'
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V ^

J

Attomey-lo-Faft^^j
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Ite..Aje.tJ)a.£aaU&LW..;^
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PUBLIC CONTRACTS
tractor but for the benefit of the state, the creditors and the surety. State ex rel. McBride v.

14-1-14

Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341
(1938).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 127.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 43 et seq.; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public
Works and Contracts § 99.
C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States § 119.

A.L.R. — Duty of public authority to dieclose to contractor information, allegedly in its
possession, affecting cost or feasibility of
project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182.
Key Numbers. — States «- 101.

14-1-14. Actions on payment bonds.
(1) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract for which a payment bond
is furnished under this chapter, and has not been paid in full within 90 days
from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was
supplied, shall have the right to sue on the payment bond for any amount
unpaid at the time the suit is filed and to sue on the contract for the amount
due.
(2) Any person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but
no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing the payment
bond, shall have a right of action upon the payment bond upon giving written
notice to the contractor within 90 days from the date on which the last of the
labor was performed or material was supplied. The person shall state in the
notice the amount claimed and the name of the party for whom the labor was
performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be served
personally or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope
addressed to the contractor at any place the contractor maintains an office or
conducts business.
(3) Any person may obtain from the appropriate political entity a certified
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and
postage. A certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original.
(4) Any action instituted on the payment bond shall be brought in the
appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to be
performed. The action shall be commenced within one one year after the
furnishing of materials or labor, except if the claimant is a subcontractor of
the contractor, the action shall be commenced within one year from the date
on which final payment under the subcontract became due.
History: L. 1983, ch. 61, ft 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of contract.
Claims of creditors against contractor.
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14-1-15

CONTRACTORS' BONDS

Last day material furnished.
Lien of laborers or materialmen.
Purpose and construction of act.
Timeliness of notice.
Abandonment of contract.
A contract could not be regarded as abandoned if its terms and conditions were performed by surety company instead of by the
contractor. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914).
C l a i m s of c r e d i t o r s against contractor.
The statute dealt only with actions against
the surety; claims of creditors against the contractor were not affected thereby and could be
asserted at any time within the general statute
of limitations. State ex rel. McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 (1938).
Last day material furnished.
Date on which the last of material was furnished was the delivery date for purposes of
this section and it was not extended by subsequent substitution of new and different controls to correct the supplier's error. A.A.
Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 24
Utah 2d 369, 472 P.2d 424 (1970).
Liens of laborers or materialmen.
Although a workman or materialman could
not acquire a lien on a public building for labor
or material furnished in the construction of
such building in view of § 38-1-1, he might
have a preferential right to money in the
hands of the public corporation to be used in
the construction of the building under this section. Mountain States Supply Co. v. NuttallAllen Co., 63 Utah 384, 225 P. 811 (1924).

P u r p o s e and construction of act.
Former law, insofar as it allowed "any person" supplying labor or materials to sue, was
highly remedial, and was, in furtherance of
justice, to receive a liberal construction and application so as to accomplish its real object and
purpose. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44
Utah 300, 140 P. 130 (1914), applying Comp.
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed.
The purpose of the former statute was to enable creditors of or claimants against contractor on public buildings to collect for work and
materials furnished by them ratably and equitably from contractor and his bondsmen in all
cases to the full amount and extent of the
surety bond. Board of Educ. v. West, 55 Utah
357, 186 P. 114 (1919).
Timeliness of notice.
Materialman having delivered goods to subcontractor of state-owned bridge project could
not hold the prime contractor or surety liable
for payment where he had no contractual relationship with the prime contractor and did not
give ninety-day notice to the contractor; under
the prior law, plaintiff had no action against
the prime contractor or surety because the action was not commenced within one year of the
date of final settlement of the bridge contract
by the state. American Oil Co. v. General Contracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 330, 411 P.2d 486
(1966).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 114 et seq.

C . J . S . — 81A C J . S . States § 125.
Key Numbers. — States •=» 101.

14-1-15. Liability of state or political subdivision failing to
obtain bond.
If the state or one of its political subdivisions fails to obtain a payment bond,
it shall, upon demand by a person who has supplied materials or performed
labor under the applicable contract, promptly make payment to that person,
and the creditor shall have a direct right of action on his account against the
appropriate political entity in any court having jurisdiction in the county in
which the contract was to be performed. The action shall be commenced
within one year after the furnishing of materials or labor.
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63-56-37.

Stale Affairs in General

particular method of construction contracting
management for each project.
itat
63-56-37. Bid security requirements.
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least S4b of
the amount of the bid shall be required for all
competitive sealed bidding for construction contracts. Bid security shall be a bond provided by a
surety company authorized to do business in this
state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form
satisfactory to the state.
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set forth in the invitation
for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to
rules and regulations, it is determined that the
failure to comply with the security requirements is
nonsubstantial.
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period specified in the invitation for
bids, except as provided in section 63-56-20(6). If
a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before
award, no action shall be taken against the bidder
or the bid security.
Htt
63-56-38. Bonds accessary when contract to
awarded.
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the
following bonds or security shall be delivered to the
state and shall become binding on the parties upon
the execution of the contract:
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the
state, in an amount equal to lOOVt of the price
specified in the contract, executed by a surety
company authorized to do business in this state or
any other form satisfactory to the state; and
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in
an amount equal to 100% of the price specified in
the contract, executed by a surety company authorized to do business in this state or any other form
satisfactory to the state, for the .protection of all
persons supplying labor and material to the contractor or i u J U i t ^ t r a c t p ^
of the
work provided for in the contract.
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a performance or payment bond where a
bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of
the state.
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or subcontractor for the work
provided in the contract, in respect of which a
payment bond is furnished under this section, who
has not been paid in full within 90 days from the
date on which the last of the labor was performed
or material was supplied by the person for whom
the claim U made, may sue on the payment bond
for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and may prosecute the action for the amount
due the person. Any^person haying a contract with a
subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or
•?1^M?fLj^JrIII*c^L.^Ll*L the contractor furnishing the
PfjmiejiL^bonJ^ has alright of action upon the
PjyjQSOi-hond. juponi_fjvinf written notice to the
contxactojLand surety company within90 days from
the date on which the last of the labor was performed or material was supplied by the person for
whom the claim is made. The person shall state in
the notice the amount claimed and the name of the
party for whom the labor was performed or to
whom the material was supplied. The notice shall be
served by registered or certified mail, postage
prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at
any place the contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business.
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(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond ]
be brought in the district court of the cou
which the construction contract was to be pcrfq
No suit may be commenced by a claimant under-j
section more than 180 days after a surety
denies that claimant's claim The obligee nan»o$J
the bond need not be joined as a party in the suit
63-56-39. Form of toads -Effect of certified
copy.
?i
The form of the bonds required by this part sifcg
be established by rules and regulations. Any pester
may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond
upon payment of the cost of reproduction of J|£
bond and postage, if any. A certified copy trffj
bond shall be prima facie evidence of the conup^
execution, and delivery of the original.
^ejflji
Part F. Contract Clauses

"*J

63-54-40. Require* coatract daases • ComfmfOom #f ^M
price adjastaseats • Use of rales tod regataUoas.
,^§
63-54-41. Cortiflcaiioa of caaate order.
63-56-40. Required coatract clauses Cosapatatioa of price adjustmeats • Use of
and regatatiOM.
(1) Rules and regulations shall require
construction contracts and may permit or
for state contracts for supplies and services1!
lusion of clauses providing for adjust!
prices, time of performance, or other ap
contract provisions, and covering the fo
subjects:
(a) The unilateral right of the state to
writing changes in the work within the scope <
contract and changes in the time of perfo
the contract that do not alter the scope of
tract work;
(b) Variations occurring between
quantities of work in a contract and actual j
ties;
(c) Suspension of work ordered by the^
and
(d) Site conditions differing from those
ated in the construction contract, or on
encountered, except that differing site conditfoas
clauses required by the rules and regulations aaf£
not be included in a construction contract when t k
contract is negotiated, when the contractor provifB
the site or design, or when the parties have othjtJv
wise agreed with respect to the risk of differing fit$
conditions.
^
(2) Adjustments in price pursuant to clauses pfpr
mulgated under subsection (1) shall be computed^
one or more of the following ways:
- ~n|
(a) By agreement on a fixed price adjustment
before commencement of the pertinent performance
or as soon thereafter as practicable;
^4.
(b) By unit prices specified in the contract 0
subsequently agreed upon;
-., $
(c) By the costs attributable to the events ft
situations under the clauses with adjustment ,9f
profit or fee, all as specified in the contract, or
subsequently agreed upon;
»>»
(d) In any other manner as the contracting
parties may mut ually agree, or;
->t
(e) In the absence of agreement by the parties,
by a unilateral determination by the state of the
costs attributable to the events or situations under
the clauses with adjustment of profit or fee, ail as
computed by the state in accordance with applicable
sections of the rules and regulations issued under

For ANNOTATIONS, please consult toe UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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